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Abstract
We examine the impact of corporate currency hedging on economic sta-
bility by introducing hedging activity in a Mundell-Fleming-Tobin frame-
work for analyzing currency and financial crises. The ratio between
hedged and unhedged firms is modelled depending on firm size as well as
hedging costs. The results indicate that, with an increasing fraction of
hedged firms in an economy, the magnitude of a crisis decreases and from
a specific hedging level onwards currency crises are ruled out. In order
to improve corporate risk management access to hedging instruments
should be made possible and hedging costs should be reduced.
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1 Introduction
One of the key ingredients in financial crises according to Krugman (2000) is foreign-
currency-denominated debt. Given such sort of debt a sudden currency depreciation
- a rising price of foreign exchange - could have serious consequences for the balance
sheets of firms. Those negative balance sheet effects may cancel out positive effects
arising from the trade balance as described by the Marshall-Lerner condition.
Krugman (2000) sketches two possible channels for avoiding financial crises. The
first possible solution is based on a growing integration of markets for goods and
services. This would weaken the contractionary balance sheet effect of a currency
depreciation and strengthen the positive effects on exports. The second channel
deals with encouraging foreign direct investment. Multinational firms, which have
subsidiaries in different countries and deal with a portfolio of different currencies,
are more likely to resist pressures arising from a specific currency. Promoting for-
eign direct investment serves to decrease negative effects of adverse trends in foreign
exchange markets. Hence, both channels focus on strengthening the independence
of a firm’s balance sheet to adverse exchange rate movements.
This paper pursues a new approach for reaching this objective. The main idea is
that some independence of a firm’s balance sheet from adverse exchange rate move-
ments can be achieved by corporate risk management. In contrast to our firm-based
approach, other authors, like Burnside, Eichenbaum and Rebelo (2001) focus on the
role of banks in currency crises. Burnside, Eichenbaum and Rebelo (2001) investi-
gate the conflict between government guarantees and banks’ hedging activities and
conclude that, the presence of guarantees eliminates banks’ incentives to hedge. As
the government guarantee serves as a kind of protection, additional risk manage-
ment is dispensable.1
1Another difference between the two approaches is simply the definition of hedging. In our
paper, hedging activity is always bound to spot market activity, and thus to the risk management
of specific capital flows exposed to exchange rate risk. In the investigation of Burnside, Eichenbaum
and Rebelo (2001) banks can even enhance “their exposure to exchange rate risk via forward
markets” (p. 1153). Hence, banks use forward markets not only for hedging activity but also for
1
Usually there are no government guarantees to firms. Therefore firms depend on
financial markets to hedge their currency exposure. We examine the impact of risk
management activities of nonfinancial firms on economic stability by introducing cor-
porate hedging in a Mundell-Fleming-Tobin type model. More specifically we here
extend the Flaschel and Semmler (2003) model to include hedging. Firms’ hedging
activity is modelled depending on firm size as well as hedging costs. Referring to
the channels mentioned by Krugman (2000), the primary advantage of corporate
risk management is the fact that, in general, it is not necessary to officially encour-
age risk management because it is a natural constituent of business. Furthermore,
nowadays, financial derivatives are available in a great variety, providing almost
perfect hedging possibilities. Hedging currency risk with financial derivatives gives
companies a powerful protection tool, and might be a key instrument for avoiding
“private sector crises”2.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 implements corporate risk management
into a Flaschel and Semmler (2003) type Mundell-Fleming-Tobin model.3 The deci-
sion whether to hedge or not is given exogenously by assuming that only large firms
can hedge their currency exposure while small companies depend completely on for-
eign exchange markets. In Section 3 all firms can hedge and the hedging decision
depends on hedging costs and expected losses due to currency depreciations. Section
4 contains concluding remarks. In the appendix we discuss hedging strategies using
currency forwards and futures as well as some empirical facts concerning currency
derivatives’ market size and availability of financial derivatives in emerging markets.
speculation. However, there is one similarity between these different approaches. In both papers,
banks and firms can fully hedge exchange rate risk.
2Goodhart (2000, p. 108).
3For a detailed discussion of the Mundell-Fleming-Tobin model, see Rødseth (2000, Chapter 6).
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2 Firm size approach
In this section, corporate hedging activity depends solely on firm size. The only
hedging instruments available are linear over-the-counter (OTC) currency forward
contracts. OTC products are “custom-made”4 and allow therefore for perfect cur-
rency hedging. However, the main disadvantage of OTC products is the fact that
they are not traded on organized exchanges. The products are not standardized
and therefore generally not available to a large number of customers. Furthermore
OTC derivatives, in general, deliver large amounts of the underlying asset. Smaller
amounts of foreign exchange compatible to specific capital flows of smaller nonfi-
nancial firms cannot be hedged perfectly with these products. Hence, in addition
to restricted access to OTC derivatives, the contract size of OTC products poses a
barrier to small firms’ hedging activity. In our model, we assume that only large
firms have access to OTC derivatives and use these products to hedge their currency
exposure perfectly. Small firms do not hedge at all. Empirical evidence supports this
approach.5 Mian (1996, p. 437) investigates corporate hedging policy and concludes:
“I find robust evidence that larger firms are more likely to hedge. This evidence
supports the hypothesis that there are economies of scale in hedging and that in-
formation and transaction considerations have more influence on hedging activities
than the cost of raising capital.”6
Our model is based on the following assumptions:
1. There are two types of firms: Large ones and small ones.
2. Only large firms can hedge their currency exposure, and they hedge it perfectly.
4Neftci (2000, p. 6).
5See Fender (2000b).
6However, Ge´czy, Minton and Schrand (1997, p. 1332) point out that the relationship between
firm size and hedging activity might not be that unambiguous. Smaller firms might hedge more
because of higher bankruptcy costs and greater information asymmetries. In our simple model, we
adopt the mainstream opinion based on empirical evidence, that there is a positive relationship
between firm size and hedging activity (see Pennings and Garcia (2004, p. 957)). The main reasons
for this positive relationship are informational economies and economies of scale as well as access
to necessary resources and the potential trading volume of large firms.
3
Small firms cannot hedge at all. Large firms are completely independent of ex-
change rate movements, while small firms are subject to adverse developments
in foreign exchange markets.
3. There are no hedging costs.
4. Small and large firms are equal, except regarding their ability to hedge.
5. Banks and trading partners recognize hedged and unhedged firms by their size.
2.1 The investment function
In our model, hedging activity affects the investment function. The investment
function of firm i is given by Ii(θ, e), where the hedging coefficient θ and the exchange
rate e enter in a multiplicative form (θ ∗ e). The term θ ∗ e represents the sensitivity
of investment to changes in the exchange rate, with hedging coefficient θ:
θ =
 0 if firm i is perfectly hedged (large firm).1 if firm i is not hedged (small firm). (1)
A perfectly hedged firm’s investment function is therefore insensitive to exchange
rate movements while unhedged firms are exposed to developments in the foreign
exchange markets.
Ii =
 I¯ if firm i is perfectly hedged (large firm).I(e) if firm i is not hedged (small firm). (2)
Figure 1 shows a firm’s payoff and the investment function in the case without cor-
porate hedging. This investment function is on par with Krugman’s (2000) type
investment function in which investment negatively depends on the nominal ex-
change rate e. The underlying idea is that firms in many developing countries have
large amounts of debt denominated in foreign currency. A currency depreciation
4
will worsen these firms’ balance sheets which will decrease their net wealth leading
to an investment contraction. The result of such a development might be a balance
sheet driven crisis in which sufficiently strong negative balance sheet effects outweigh
positive competitiveness effects leading to a backward bending goods market curve.7
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Firm’s payoffs depending on e Investment function without hedging
Figure 1: Economy consisting of small firms
The payoff function in Figure 1 represents any cash flow connected to the liabilities
held in foreign currency. In the case of a depreciation of the domestic currency the
value of the liabilities increases, resulting in a loss, while an appreciation of the
domestic currency decreases the value of the liabilities, which can be taken as profit.
The payoff function in Figure 1 is linear for simplicity, in order to introduce simple
linear hedging techniques to potentiate perfect hedging possibilities.8 However, the
investment function is not linear due to the balance sheet effect connected to the
7See Krugman (2000, p. 82-84).
8Perfect hedging possibilities can also be generated using nonlinear instruments such as swaps
and options. One could also use structured notes, linking foreign currency risk to credit risk.
Another approach are the so-called macro derivatives. They combine risks associated to contract
specific variables like exchange rates, interest rates and counterparty default as well as more general
variables such as GDP (see Schweimayer (2003)). Again, there are many possible hedging strategies
but in this context it is appropriate to use simple linear currency forwards. An example how to
conduct currency hedging using forwards and futures is presented in the appendix.
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financial accelerator mechanism as discussed in Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist
(1994).9
Figure 2 corresponds to the first line of equation (2), where Ii = I¯. The payoff
function shows a simple, linear currency forward hedging strategy. Here, the central
idea is, that the forward position generates profits if the spot position generates
losses. Profits and losses sum up to zero. If the spot position generates profits as
the result of an appreciation the forward position generates losses, again summing
up to zero.10
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Single firm’s hedged payoffs Investment function with hedging
Figure 2: Economy consisting of large firms
Since foreign liabilities are perfectly hedged against adverse currency movements the
investment function shown in Figure 2 is independent of the exchange rate. Large
firms which have access to financial derivatives will hedge their currency exposure
and hence, surrender potential gains by an appreciation. Fender (2000a, p. 10)
describes the reason as follows: “It is a fundamental insight, that under uncertainty,
risk-averse decision-makers will prefer stable income and consumption streams to
9See e.g. Proan˜o-Acosta, Flaschel and Semmler (2004, p. 4).
10For similar graphical representations of linear hedging strategies, see Grannis and Fitzgerald
(1989, p. 102) and Gerke and Bank (1998, p. 444).
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highly variable ones.” Furthermore, trading partners as well as banks recognize a
hedged firm just by the fact that this specific firm is a large firm. By knowing this,
negative balance sheet effects can be avoided even if the hedge position is off-balance
sheet.
Assuming that there are n firms in the economy, the investment function depends
on the average hedging coefficient of the economy
φ =
1
n
n∑
i=1
θi , 0 ≤ φ ≤ 1 (3)
In a perfectly hedged economy, where all n firms hedge their currency exposure
perfectly, the investment function is constant: I(φ, e) = I¯. In the case that no firm
hedges, the investment function is I(φ, e) = I(e).
2.2 The goods market
We get the following representation of goods market equilibrium
Y = C(Y − δK¯ − T¯ ) + I(φ, e) + G¯+NX(Y, Y¯ ∗, e) (4)
The shape of the IS curve with the dependent variable Y , and the independent
variable e, is given by the Implicit Function Theorem11:
Y ′(e) = − Ie +NXe
CY +NXY − 1 (5)
Since CY +NXY < 1 by assumption
12, the term CY +NXY − 1 is negative. Hence,
Y ′(e) is upward sloping if
NXe > Ie (6)
Equation (6) holds always true if φ = 0, which means that all firms hedge their
currency exposure perfectly. In this case there is no backward bending IS curve.
11See Flaschel and Semmler (2003, p. 7).
12See Flaschel and Semmler (2003, p. 4).
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2.3 The financial markets
The financial markets are fully described by the following equations:13
Private Wealth: Wp =M0 +B0 + eFp0 (7)
LM-Curve: M = m(Y, r), mY > 0,mr < 0 (8)
Demand for foreign bonds: eFp = f(ξ,Wp), fξ < 0, fWp ∈ (0, 1) (9)
Risk premium: ξ = r − r¯∗ − ε (10)
Expected depreciation: ε = βε(
e0
e
− 1), εe ≤ 0 (11)
Demand for domestic bonds: B = Wp −m(Y, r)− f(ξ,Wp) (12)
Foreign exchange market: F¯ ∗ = Fp + Fc (13)
with the domestic interest rate r, the foreign interest rate r¯∗, private foreign bond
holdings eFp, and the central bank’s foreign bond holdings Fc. Equation (11)
presents a typical formulation of regressive expectations as discussed in Rødseth
(2000, p. 21) with εe ≤ 0 and ε(e0) = 0 for the steady state exchange rate level e0.
Economic agents have perfect knowledge of the future equilibrium exchange rate and
therefore expect the actual exchange rate to adjust to the steady state value after
the occurrence of a shock. Flaschel and Semmler (2003, p. 5) call these expectations
allowing agents to behave forward looking “asymptotically rational”.
Solving equation (8) for r, inserting the result in equation (10), and inserting further
equation (10) as well as equation (7) in equation (9) gives the Financial Markets
Equilibrium Curve (AA-Curve):
eFp = f(r(Y,M0)− r¯∗ − βε(e0
e
− 1),M0 +B0 + eFp0) (14)
The slope of the AA-curve is determined by the Implicit Function Theorem14
e′(Y ) = − fξ ∗ rY−fξ ∗ εe + (fWp − 1) ∗ Fp0
< 0 (15)
13See Flaschel and Semmler (2003) and Proan˜o-Acosta, Flaschel and Semmler (2004).
14See e.g. Proan˜o-Acosta, Flaschel and Semmler (2004, p. 8).
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The AA-curve is downward sloping since fξ < 0, rY > 0, εe ≤ 0, fWp ∈ (0, 1), and
Fp0 ≥ 0.
2.4 Case study
We obtain the adjustment process of the goods market equilibrium curve
Y˙ = βY [C(Y − δK¯ − T¯ ) + I(φ, e) + G¯+NX(Y, Y¯ ∗, e)− Y ] (16)
and the following dynamics of the financial markets:
e˙ = βe[f(r(Y,M0)− r¯∗ − βε(e0
e
− 1),M0 +B0 + eFp0)− eFp0] (17)
Figure 3 presents IS-AA diagrams for different values of the average hedging coeffi-
cient φ (Cases A, B, C, D). In the following, we discuss the characteristics of Cases
A, B, C, and D as well as the local stability properties.
• Case A: φ = 1
In this case no firm is hedged. Consequetially there are only small firms that
do not have access to hedging tools. Hence, this case corresponds to the case
presented in Krugman (2000) and Flaschel and Semmler (2003). The figure
shows multiple equilibria with E1 representing the ‘good equilibrium’ with high
output Y1 and low exchange rate e1, and E3 represents the ‘crisis equilibrium’
with low output Y3 and high exchange rate e3.
• Case B: φ = 0
Case B illustrates the situation where all firms are hedged perfectly. With
the investment function being independent of the exchange rate, net exports
remain the only linkage between Y and e. In the case of a perfectly hedged
economy there is no backward bending IS curve and thus, there are no multiple
equilibria. In this framework a currency crises cannot occur.
9
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Case C: 0 < φ < 1 Case D: 0 < φ < 1
Figure 3: IS-AA diagrams for different values of φ
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• Cases C and D: 0 < φ < 1
Cases C and D present other possible outcomes depending on the value of
φ. With decreasing φ the ‘bad equilibrium’ E3 moves down the AA-curve
towards higher values of Y and lower values of e. Hence, in the multiple
equilibria case (Case D) the severity of a currency crisis decreases with growing
hedging activity. In Case C the hedging activity is sufficient to avoid multiple
equilibria. In this case a currency crisis does not occur.
2.5 Stability analysis
In order to study the stability of the system the Jacobian matrix is derived:
J =
 βY [CY +NXY − 1] βY [Ie +NXe]
βe[fξ ∗ rY ] βe[−fξ ∗ εe + (fWp − 1) ∗ Fp0]

Considering fξ < 0, rY > 0, fWp ∈ [0, 1] and εe ≤ 0, we obtain the following signs:
J =
 − ?
− −

Referring to the four cases mentioned above, it depends on the sign of ‘?’ whether
a specific equilibrium (E1, E2, E3) is stable or unstable:
• Case A: φ = 1
? = βY [Ie +NXe]
If Ie dominates NXe (E2), ‘?’ is negative. The determinant and the trace of
the Jacobian are both negative (det(JE2) < 0, tr(JE2) < 0). Hence, E2 is a
saddle point.15
If NXe dominates Ie (E1, E3), ‘?’ is positive. Hence, det(J(E1,3)) > 0 and
tr(J(E1,3)) < 0, which gives a stable steady state.
15See the ‘Trace-Determinant Plane’ in Hirsch, Smale and Devaney (2004, p. 63).
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• Case B: φ = 0
Since Ie = 0, we get ? = βY [NXe] > 0.
We have a single equilibrium (E1) which is stable since det(JE1) > 0 and
tr(JE1) < 0.
• Cases C and D: 0 < φ < 1
Case C, the single equilibrium case, is similar to Case B. In the equilibrium
point (E1) NXe dominates Ie, the sign of ‘?’ is positive, det(JE1) > 0, and
tr(JE1) < 0. The equilibrium E1 is stable.
The dynamics of the multiple equilibria, Case D, equal the dynamics of Case
A. If Ie dominates NXe (E2), we get det(JE2) < 0, tr(JE2) < 0. Conse-
quently E2 is unstable. If NXe dominates Ie (E1, E3), then det(J(E1,3)) > 0 and
tr(J(E1,3)) < 0. Hence, the ‘good equilibrium’ E1 and the ‘crisis equilibrium’E3
are both stable.
3 Hedging costs approach
In the previous section the firms’ decisions whether to hedge currency risk or not is
given exogenously by assuming that small firms cannot hedge while large firms are
able to hedge their currency exposure perfectly. In this section all firms have the
ability to hedge their currency exposure perfectly. Standardized hedging instruments
like currency futures are tradeable on organized exchanges and, thus, available to
all firms.16 The decision whether to hedge or not is based on hedging costs and
expected losses due to adverse exchange rate movements.
Again, the investment function of firm i is given by Ii(θi, e), where θi depends on
hedging costs ch and expected losses L(e):
16For more details on hedging with currency forwards and futures, see the appendix.
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θi =
 0 if ch < L(e)1 if ch ≥ L(e) (18)
Since main hedging tools can be traded at low costs, the hedging costs ch consist
almost solely of costs of information and costs of implementing sophisticated risk
assessment procedures. In fact, most over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives are ‘zero-
sum games’, which means that no upfront fees are payable. The costs of exchange
traded derivatives do not pose a barrier either. Taking a futures position costs an
initial margin, which is “seldom more than a small fraction of the costs of the un-
derlying securities, although it does vary from contract to contract.”17 Additionally,
most OTC derivatives are off-balance sheet items.18Hence, the costs connected to
OTC transactions do not appear in firms’ balance sheets, and costs arising from
trading exchange traded derivatives are neglected because of their small size.
Losses L(e) depend positively on the nominal exchange rate e. The payoff function
presented in Figure 1 can be interpreted as an inverse loss function. In the case of an
appreciation of the domestic currency the loss function becomes negative, which has
to be equated with profit. In this context, feared losses can be taken as a measure
of risk aversion among firms. Increasing risk aversion decreases risky business and
thereby has an overall positive effect on investment.
The main idea presented in equation (18) consists of the assumption that firms will
only hedge if the expected loss due to a currency depreciation L(e) exceeds the
hedging costs ch. If firms expect the domestic currency to appreciate they will not
hedge because of hedging costs as well as missed gains due to corresponding losses
of the hedge position.19
17Chew (1996, p. 15).
18Garber (1998, p. 6) points out that the only exception are contracts where financial flows
occur at the time of the trade, for instance when a collateral is demanded by a market maker. For
a discussion about off-balance sheet derivatives, ‘shadow transactions’ and the resulting problems
concerning the balance sheet as a measure for risk and creditworthiness, see Dodd (2000, 2002).
19See the payoff function in Figure 2.
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The balance sheets shown in Tables 1 and 2 illustrate this. The unhedged firm’s
balance sheet presented in Table 1 equals the balance sheet presented in Flaschel
and Semmler (2003). Investment depends solely on foreign liabilities and thus on
currency developments. However, exchange rates can move in two directions as
presented in Figure 1: A depreciation of the domestic currency worsens the balance
sheet while an appreciation has the opposite effect.
Table 1: Unhedged Firm’s Balance Sheet
Assets Liabilities
pK eFf
Table 2 shows a hedged firm’s balance sheet. Here, the value of the foreign liabilities
is independent of exchange rate movements. Hence, there is no loss by a currency
depreciation and no gain by an appreciation. The costs for this guaranteed stable
values of the liabilities are the hedging costs payed by the firm. The hedging costs
reduce the value of the firm’s assets, therefore it is very important for any firm
to calculate potential losses induced by adverse exchange rate movements and to
compare them to the hedging costs.
Table 2: Hedged Firm’s Balance Sheet
Assets Liabilities
pK − ch Ff
3.1 The case of n homogeneous firms
In an economy with n homogeneous firms, with identical hedging costs and loss
functions, we have the following investment function:
14
I =
 I¯ if ch < L(e).I(e) if ch ≥ L(e). (19)
Because of the homogeneity, all firms act equally with respect to their hedging
activities. If the expected loss due to a depreciation of the domestic currency exceeds
the hedging costs, firms will attempt to hedge their currency exposure perfectly.
However, if the hedging costs exceed the expected losses or, if the firms expect an
appreciation of the domestic currency that would decrease the value their liabilities,
they will not hedge at all.
Again, the Jacobian is given by
J =
 βY [CY +NXY − 1] βY [Ie +NXe]
βe[fξ ∗ rY ] βe[−fξ ∗ εe + (fWp − 1) ∗ Fp0]

with
Ie =
 0 if ch < L(e).Ie if ch ≥ L(e). (20)
In the case of a perfectly hedged economy, i.e. Ie = 0, the signs of the Jacobian are
as follows:
J =
 − +
− −

Here, a currency crisis cannot occur because there is no backward bending goods
market curve. The single equilibrium is stable since det(J) > 0 and tr(J) < 0.
However, with ch ≥ L(e), we obtain the multiple equilibria case already discussed
(Case A in Figure 3). In this setting, we can only investigate the cases φ = 0 and
φ = 1.
15
3.2 The case of n heterogeneous firms
In this section we discuss a more general hedging costs approach compared to the
last section. Here, hedging costs and loss functions vary among firms. Again, the
investment function of firm i is given by Ii(θi, e), where the hedging coefficient θi
and the exchange rate e enter in a multiplicative form (θi ∗ e), with θi ∈ [0, 1] for
all i = 1, ..., n. The hedging coefficient θi depends on hedging costs ch,i and losses
Li(e) with
20
θi =
 0 if ch,i < Li(e)1 if ch,i ≥ Li(e) (21)
Because of firms’ heterogeneity and corresponding individual hedging costs ch,i and
losses Li(e), it is possible that firm j hedges its currency exposure while firm k
abstains from hedging. Therefore there are hedged as well as unhedged firms in the
economy. The average hedging coefficient of the economy is
φ =
1
n
n∑
i=1
θi , 0 ≤ φ ≤ 1 (22)
Reducing hedging costs, such as costs of information and costs connected to deriva-
tive trading, in general leads to more hedging activity by the individual firm (θi ↙),
and thus to a higher hedging level of the entire economy (φ↙). This in turn reduces
the sensitivity of investment to the exchange rate (Ie ↙). Decreasing Ie reduces the
backward bending part of the goods market curve, and therefore the probability of
crisis. Hence, the lower hedging costs (ch,i) and the higher feared losses of a deval-
uation (Li(e)), the more firms will hedge their currency exposure and the less risk
is there for the entire economy. Compared to the previous section, the assumption
of heterogeneous firms allows us to discuss all cases 0 ≤ φ ≤ 1. Given a large
20Remember that, θi = 0 corresponds to a perfect hedge while θi = 1 is the unhedged case,
respectively.
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number of firms hedge, in our model, a currency crisis is ruled out by the fact that
the IS-curve crosses the AA-curve only once.21 Increasing risk aversion, providing
information as well as risk management techniques and access to risk management
instruments such as derivatives are the key factors in order to avoid financial crises.
4 Conclusions
The main result of this investigation is that economic stability can be increased
by enhancing corporate hedging either by directly simplifying access to hedging
instruments (Firm size approach) or indirectly by lowering hedging costs as well
as increasing the awareness of specific risks (Hedging costs approach). Under the
assumption that firms can limit currency risk by hedging, currency depreciations
are more manageable and less likely to result in currency and financial crises. In
our model, corporate hedging decreases the backward bending segment of the goods
market curve “that is key to the possibility of crisis”22.
Referring to this result the main duty of officials appears to be the achievement
of more transparency and the improvement of information flows. This could be
realized by regulating transactions of OTC derivatives leading to easier access to
OTC products and reducing the costs of information, and thus the costs of hedging.
21See Case C in Figure 3.
22Krugman (1999, p. 6).
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A Some notes on currency hedging
In this appendix we take a closer look at different hedging strategies using foreign
exchange forwards and futures. Since forwards and futures exhibit completely dif-
ferent trading characteristics, this is to be valued highly. As we assume their payoff
functions to be identical, the differences in how they are traded become more rele-
vant regarding the different approaches in this paper.
In the ‘Firm size approach’ we assume that only large firms have access to hedging
products. Furthermore, large firms hedge their currency exposure perfectly. These
characteristics fit to custom-made over-the-counter (OTC) products such as for-
wards.23Moreover, hedging costs do not play any role or as Hull (2000, p. 59) puts
it: “The value of a forward contract at the time it is first entered into is zero.”
The ‘Hedging costs approach’ gives all firms the possibility to hedge. This approach
is better applicable to hedging products traded on organized exchanges like futures.
Getting access to futures is much easier than getting access to OTC products. How-
ever, trading futures costs an initial margin.
The problem with futures hedging is that it does not necessarily lead to perfect
hedges. In this section we show that, using a very simple numerical example, un-
der simplified assumptions, the futures hedging strategy is at least asymptotically
perfect. We also show at the end of this section that currency forwards and futures
play a dominant role among currency derivatives and that, nowadays, derivative
products are available in many emerging markets, too.
23In this paper perfect hedges are ‘equal and opposite’ hedges. Perfect hedges can generally be
achieved in many ways. Jorion (2001, p. 12) points out that, “The breadth of coverage against
risks is astonishing. Hedging with derivatives is similar to purchasing insurance”. In their empirical
paper, Fung and Leung (1991, p. 89) state that: “The result implies that financial managers of
multinational firms can avoid spending time and resources to estimate the optimal hedge ratio but
simply adopt the naive (one-to-one) strategy when using forward markets for hedging currency
risk.” In the context of the simple model used in this paper, we will only discuss the ‘naive’
hedging strategy.
18
A.1 Setting up a simple scenario
We begin the explanation of currency hedging with a simple scenario. An European
firm borrows $1, 000, 000 in t = 0 from an U.S. bank and sells the dollars for euros
immediately. In t = 1 the firm has to buy $1, 100, 000, the amount received plus
interest (i = 10%), to repay the debt. If the exchange rate is constant over the time
horizon (et=0 = et=1), the firm repays exactly the expected debt value, i.e. borrowed
amount plus interest. If the domestic currency depreciates, the price of the dollar
per euro increases (et=0 < et=1), which results in an increased debt value in terms
of the domestic currency.
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a) Constant exchange rate: et=0 = et=1 b) Depreciation: et=0 < et=1
Figure 4: Debt denominated in foreign currency
Figure 4 shows the debt value in terms of the domestic currency (BC) in the case
of a stable exchange rate (et=0 = et=1 = 1
BC
$
) and in the case of a depreciation of
the domestic currency (et=0 = 1
BC
$
< et=1 = 1.5
BC
$
). In the case of the depreciation,
compared to the stable one, the price of a dollar per euro increases, leading to a
higher debt value in euros. The loss due to the steep domestic currency depreciation
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is the debt value to be repayed in dollars times the difference between the exchange
rate at the date of the spot contract et=0 and the actual exchange rate at the spot
commitment date et=1:
$1, 100, 000 ∗ (1BC
$
− 1.5BC
$
) = BC−550, 000 (23)
A.2 A simple forward hedging strategy
The firm has to enter into a long forward contract in t = 0, to buy $ 1,100,000 in
t = 1, in order to hedge the spot position:
$1, 100, 000 ∗ (1.5BC
$
− 1BC
$
) = BC550, 000 (24)
where et=0 = 1
BC
$
is the delivery price and et=1 = 1.5
BC
$
is the spot price of the U.S.
dollar per euro at maturity of the contract. The forward contract gives the holder
the obligation to buy the underlying ($1, 100, 000) at the delivery price et=0 = 1
BC
$
on
the spot commitment date et=1. The $1, 100, 000 receivable will be sold immediately
for euros on the spot foreign exchange market at the spot exchange rate et=1 = 1.5
BC
$
.
Hence, the forward position ends up with a profit (BC550, 000). The hedged return
equals the sum of spot and forward returns:
BC−550, 000 + BC550, 000 = 0 (25)
The simple hedging strategy presented here results in a perfect hedge. However, we
made some assumptions for simplicity that shall be discussed in the following:
• The firm puts on the hedge at the date when the debt is borrowed (t = 0)
and removes it when the debt is repayed (t = 1). Hence, for this specific time
frame currency forwards must be available. In our model this does not cause
problems because forwards are traded over-the-counter, which means that they
exactly meet the hedgers’ requirements.
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• The size of the spot position equals the forward position (‘equal and opposite’
position: $1, 100, 000). Again, this is no problem since OTC derivatives are
individually arranged.
A.3 A simple futures hedging strategy
Futures hedging is not as simple as hedging with forwards, and, on average, it does
not lead to a perfect hedge. The reason for this is that futures are standardized
products, traded on organized exchanges and thus, generally, do not exactly meet
the hedgers’ requirements. If the size and the timing of the futures position are not
equal to the spot commitment, it is almost impossible to completely eliminate the
currency risk. In this case an ‘equal and opposite’ hedge is not available and the
hedger has to compute the risk minimizing hedging position24
h = −Q ∗ β (26)
with Q the size of the spot commitment and β the hedging coefficient
β =
cov(ft=1, st=1)
var(ft=1)
=
covariance of futures price change with spot price change
variance of futures price change
(27)
As already mentioned there are two main problems when hedging with futures:
The timing and the size of the hedging position. First, we examine the timing
problem. An arbitrage free environment requires that spot prices equal futures
prices at delivery (st=1 = ft=1) if the spot commitment date coincides with the
futures delivery date (t = 1). Hence, we can write equation (27) as25
β =
cov(ft=1, st=1)
var(ft=1)
=
var(ft=1)
var(ft=1)
= 1 (28)
24For a detailed look at futures hedging, see Duffie (1989, Chapter 7).
25See Duffie (1989, p. 207).
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In this case we, again, obtain an ‘equal and opposite’ strategy:
h = −Q ∗ β = −Q (29)
If we further assume that prices in spot and futures markets are perfectly correlated,
equation (28) holds for all points in time t. Hence, it is not necessary that futures
delivery date equals spot commitment date to achieve a perfect hedge. In the case
that the futures position matures after the spot commitment date, the hedger offsets
the position before maturity in t = 1. On the other hand, if the horizon of the futures
position is too short, the hedger can ‘roll-over’ the contract and, again, offset the
position in t = 1.
The second problem is the size of the futures position. In our numerical example
above the hedging position has a total value of $1, 100, 000. However, futures that
exactly deliver $1, 100, 000 are, on average, not available on the futures exchange.
Instead smaller futures contracts are traded, e.g. delivering $10, 000. In this case
our hedging position consists of:
h = $1, 100, 000 = $10, 000 ∗ 110 contracts (30)
The firm takes a futures position of 110 contracts.
Now, consider the case where only futures delivering $15, 000 are available. Here,
the optimal hedging position is:
h = $15, 000 ∗ 73 contracts = $1, 095, 000 6= $1, 100, 000 (31)
This hedging strategy does not lead to an ‘equal and opposite’ hedge. However,
99.54% of the spot position are hedged with this strategy, which is very close to a
perfect hedge. Hence, we can argue that, with a growing variety of futures contracts
available, hedging strategies of firms become asymptotically perfect.
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A.4 Empirical facts
Figure 5 illustrates the size of foreign exchange derivatives markets and the key role
played by currency forwards and futures. The amounts outstanding, presented in
Figure 5, are gross market values of the OTC derivatives, i.e. forwards and forex
swaps, currency swaps and OTC options, and notional principal of exchange traded
futures and options.
Options (Exchange Traded)
Currency Futures
Options (OTC)
Currency Swaps
Forwards and Forex Swaps
0 100 200 300 400 500 600
 37.9
 80.1
136.0
557.0
607.0
Data source: BIS Quarterly Review, September 2004.
Figure 5: Amounts Outstanding of Foreign Exchange Derivatives (December 2003;
in billions of U.S. dollars)
Table 3 shows that today derivatives products are also available in many emerging
markets. Most of the exchanges presented in Table 3 were founded in the 1990s.
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